Though it had improved its personal injury rate before the Texas City explosion that killed 15 in March 2005, BP has material process safety deficiencies at all five of its U.S. refineries, according to an independent safety review panel, which was chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker.

The report released last month includes specific and extensive recommendations to improve BP’s corporate safety oversight, corporate safety culture, and corporate and site process safety management systems relating to its five U.S. refineries.

The BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel also found that significant process safety culture issues exist at each refinery, not just the Texas City facility that experienced a tragic explosion in March 2005.

The findings and recommendations are included in a 300+ page report that the panel has delivered to BP’s Group Chief Executive John Browne. The report is available on BP’s website at www.bp.com/bakerpanelreport.

“If BP dedicates itself to implementing the panel’s recommendations, we believe BP U.S. refineries can significantly improve their process safety performance,” said panel chairman James A. Baker, III, the 61st U.S. Secretary of State.

“We are under no illusion that the deficiencies we have identified are unique to BP,” Baker said. “If other refining and chemical companies consider our recommendations and apply them, we believe that those workplaces will be safer and that future tragedies like the Texas City accident can be avoided.”

BP created the panel in October 2005 following an urgent recommendation to do so issued by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board in the aftermath of the accident at Texas City. In its report, the panel maintains a central theme that prior to the Texas City tragedy, BP emphasized personal safety and had achieved significant improvement in personal injury rates. But the company did not emphasize process safety. BP mistakenly interpreted improving personal injury rates as an indication of acceptable process safety performance at its U.S. refineries.

BP’s reliance on this data, combined  with an inadequate process safety understanding, created a false sense of confidence that BP was properly addressing process safety risks. The panel made specific and extensive recommendations in 10 areas, including specific guidance to BP for implementation of the recommendations, which are summarized below:

1) The Board of Directors of BP, BP’s executive management (including its Group Chief Executive), and other members of BP’s corporate management must provide effective leadership on process safety. Those individuals must demonstrate their commitment to process safety by articulating a clear message on the importance of process safety and matching  that message both with the policies they adopt and the actions they take.

2) BP should establish and implement an integrated and comprehensive process safety management system that systematically and continuously identifies, reduces, and manages process safety risks at its U.S. refineries.

3) BP should develop and implement a system to ensure that its executive management, its refining line management above the refinery level, and all U.S. refining personnel, including managers, supervisors, workers and contractors, possess an appropriate level of process safety knowledge and expertise.

4) BP should involve the relevant stakeholders to develop a positive, trusting, and open process safety culture within each U.S. refinery.

5) BP should clearly define expectations and strengthen accountability for process safety performance at all levels in executive management and in the refining managerial and supervisory reporting line.

6) BP should provide more effective and better coordinated process safety support for the U.S. refining line organization.

7) BP should develop, implement, maintain and periodically update an integrated set of leading and lagging performance indicators for more effectively monitoring the process safety performance of the U.S. refineries. In addition, BP should work with the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board and with industry, labor organizations, other governmental agencies, and other organizations to develop a consensus set of leading and lagging indicators for process safety performance for use in the refining and chemical processing industries.

8) BP should establish and implement an effective system to audit process safety performance at its U.S. refineries.

9) BP’s Board should monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the panel (including the related commentary) and the ongoing process safety performance of BP’s U.S. refineries. The Board should, for a period of at least five calendar years, engage an independent monitor to report annually to the Board on BP’s progress in implementing the panel’s recommendations (including the related commentary). The Board should also report publicly on the progress of such implementation and on BP’s ongoing process safety performance.

10) BP should use the lessons learned from the Texas City tragedy and from the panel’s report to transform the company into a recognized industry leader in process safety management. The report notes that the panel was not charged to conduct an investigation into the causes of the tragic accident at Texas City in March 2005 and did not seek to affix blame or apportion responsibility for that accident.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has reached a major milestone: the completion of construction at the 1,000th site under Superfund, the federal government program that cleans up abandoned hazardous waste sites.

At 95 percent of all Superfund sites listed by the agency, construction is complete or construction is in progress. Five hundred-fifty sites are ready to be or have already been returned to communities for productive uses.

EPA is working with communities to transform contaminated sites into community assets. Locations that once pulled local economies down are now generating new tax revenues and serving as catalysts for broader revitalization. Redevelopment at Superfund sites has resulted in more than 80,000 on-site jobs and $2.7 billion in annual income, according to the EPA.

To mark the 1000th construction completion, EPA officials joined South Carolina state and local government officials, and representatives of the Magnolia Development LLC and Cherokee Investment Partners at the Macalloy Corp. Site celebration.

By integrating remediation and redevelopment plans, EPA and its partners completed work at the site in six years and several million dollars less than original estimates.

Existing commercial and industrial businesses along the Ashley River will be relocated onto about 30 acres of the site, and the Charleston area is expected to benefit from a new port facility at the remaining roughly 115 acres of the site.

Superfund was created in 1980 when Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to clean up the nation’s uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. For more information about the Superfund Program, go to www.epa.gov/superfund/news/1000cc.htm.

New guidance from OSHA has alerted shipyard employers and their employees about abrasive blasting hazards and the controls that can be implemented to protect employees.

“This new guidance focuses on silica alternatives since most shipyards have moved away from using silica as a blasting agent,” said OSHA Administrator Edwin G. Foulke, Jr. “However, alternative blasting materials may bring a different set of hazards, so we want shipyard employees and their employers to have the most up-to-date safety and health information possible.”

The new guidance also addresses the specific air contaminants that employees may be exposed to during abrasive blasting.

Other abrasive blasting safety and  health hazards are discussed with recommendations on how to avoid these occupational hazards, such as engineering controls, the use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), exposure monitoring, medical surveillance and training on the OSHA Hazard Communication and PPE standards.

OSHA also recommends that employers perform an inspection of the worksite to identify additional hazards, such as excessive noise, static electricity, confined spaces, heat exposure and fall hazards.

The guidance also encourages employers to research each of the discussed hazards, as well as understand the suggested preventative measures and the abatement that has been detailed in the guidance.

Although these guidelines are designed specifically for shipyard employment, OSHA says that employers with similar work environments will also find this information useful. For more information, go to www.osha.gov.

The EPA has finalized a Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) rule that encourages reductions in chemical emissions and increases in recycling at facilities nationwide. EPA also announced its decision to continue requiring TRI data reporting on an annual basis.

“EPA is delivering a cleaner, healthier nation by encouraging businesses to make environmental improvements now and in the future,” said Deputy Administrator Marcus Peacock. “Cleaner businesses are more efficient businesses, which is good for the environment, good for the economy and good for the American people.”

These changes in no way affect the specific chemicals or amounts of chemicals facilities are authorized to release to the environment. In addition, the final rule does not exempt any facility from reporting their releases, nor does it remove any chemicals from the TRI.

The rule allows facilities that completely eliminate